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Measuring the Gains from
International Portfolio Diversification
A remarkable feature of the world economy dur-
ing the past several years has been the explosive
growth in international flows ofequities and
bonds. For example, during the period 1984 to
1990, gross cross-border equity flows increased
from approximately $300 billion per year to
about $1.7 trillion, an annual rate increase of
over 30 percent. Moreover, currently one out of
seven equity trades worldwide involves a foreign
party, while one out of ten u.s. equity trades
takes place outside the United States. The num-
bers associated with the growth ofthe emerging
markets of Southeast Asia are even more dra-
matic. During the period 1988 to 1993, it is esti-
mated that capitalization of the Malaysian stock
market increased from $15 billion to $76 billion,
Thailand's market grew from $6 billion to $27
billion, and capitalization of the Indonesian
stock market soared from $100 million to $10 bil-
lion, with most of the money flowing into these
markets coming from foreigners.
On the face of it, these trends suggest that there
must be large gains from international diversifi-
cation. Before jumping to conclusions, though,
it is important to realize that despite the recent
surge in international equity flows, when cross-
border equity holdings are expressed as a share
of total wealth or income they remain quite mod-
est; in particular, they are much smaller than
most theories of optimal asset allocation would
predict. This observation has led to recent re-
search cautioning that the gains from interna-
tional diversification might be much smaller than
is commonly believed. Howdo we know which is
true? On what factors does the answer depend?
This Letter will briefly discuss the methods econ-
omists use to quantify the benefits from interna-
tional asset trade. We will do so by attempting to
answer the following hypothetical question: How
much additional income per year would an in-
vestor require to forgo the opportunity to invest
abroad?
Using the CAPM to measure the gains
In the early 1960s, William Sharpe (1964) and
John Lintner (1965) developed the first formal,
quantitative model of capital market risk and
equilibrium, the now famous Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model (CAPM). The essential insight ofthis
model is that the risk of a given security has more
to do with the covariance of its return with that
of other assets than with the variance ofits own
return. This is because the part of a security's re-
turn that is uncorrelated with the return on other
assets can be diversified away by holding a port-
folio of the assets. If diversifiablerisk were re-
warded in the form of a higher expected return,
investors would in effect receive a "free lunch:'
Competitive equilibrium in the capital market
eliminates free lunches.
While the distinction between diversifiable and
nondiversifiable risk provides the foundation for
pricing risk in the CAPM, what makes the model
useful are the assumptions that Sharpe andLintner
make concerning investors' preferences and be-
liefs. Sharpe and Lintner show that if investors
care only about the mean and variance of the
return on their portfolios, and share common
beliefs about the future, then in equilibrium they
will all end up holding an identical portfolio
of risky assets, namely the "market portfolio:'
which is simply a value-weighted share of all
(traded) assets.
The CAPM delivers an elegant, theoretically co-
herent approach to measuring the gains from
portfolio diversification. In the CAPM, the equi-
librium trade-off between risk and return is
measured by the "Sharpe ratio:' which is defined
as the ratio of the rate of return on the market
portfolio (in excess of the risk-free rate) to the
standard deviation of this return. In other words,
the Sharpe ratio tells us how much extra return
an investor requires in order to take on an addi-
tional unitof risk. Thus, to quantify the gains toFRBSf
international diversification, all we need to do is
measure how the Sharpe ratio changes when we
move from a market portfolio consisting of only
domestic stocks to one consisting of both foreign
and domestic stocks.
This calculation has been done by Tesar and
Werner (1992). They consider stock market re-
turns in the U.s., japan, U.K., Germany, and
Canada during the period 1980 to 1990. Their
results imply that (assuming investors expect the
future to be like the past) in order to persuade
a U.S. investor to invest only in domestic assets,
we would have to offer him a rate ofreturn that
is 3.2 percent higher than the U.S. market return.
Alternatively, instead of offering the investor a
higher return, we could simply supplement his
income each year sothat a "ban" on foreign in-
vestmentdoesn't make him any worse off.This
provides a more direct measure ofthe gains from
diversification. Of course, the required compen-
sation will not be thesame for everyone.lndivid-
uals who like to invest in the stock market will
tend to demand a higher compensation than
those who invest mainly in safe assets like T-bills.
Still, we can get a rough picture of the gains by
considering a "typical" investor who puts 25
percent of his wealth into safe assets and invests
the remaining 75 percent in the stock market.
Using results from Obstfeld (1992), it turns out
thatthis investor would need a 7.3 percent in-
crease in annual income as compensation for a
ban on foreign investment. Although this might
not seem like a large increase, remember the
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Thus, a 7.3 percent increase in income translates
into an annual benefit of $475 billion! The un-
derlying source of this gain is the relatively weak
correlation among national stock markets. For ex-
ample, during this period correlations with the
u.s. market ranged from a low of .29 in the case
ofjapan toa high of .75 in the case of Canada.
To the extent that the correlation among stock
markets has increased, the gains from diversifi-
cation have decreased.
The conclusion that the gains from international
diversification are large has been the conven-
tional wisdom since the CAPM was first applied
to international stock market data. This conclu-
sion presents a puzzle, however. If the gains are
so big, why aren't investors more internationally
diversified? As noted earlier, despite the large
recent flows into foreign equity markets, when
expressed as a share of wealth or income, inves-
tor portfolios are still strongly biased toward
domestic assets. In particular, they don't look
anything like the value-weighted shares pre-
dictedby the CAPM. For example, the U.s. mar-
ket constitutes roughly 40 percent of world stock
market capitalization. The CAPM therefore pre-
dicts that U.s. residents should hold 60 percent
of their (risky) portfolios in foreign equities. In-
stead, according to Tesar and Werner, U.S. resi-
dents only hold about 5 percentoftheir portfolios
in foreign equities. Moreover, the discrepancy
tends to be worse for other countries, whose
stock markets are a much smaller share of the
world market portfolio.
Why are investors' portfolios biased toward do-
mestic assets? Unfortunately, quick fixes to the
CAPM, like accounting for transactions costs and
exchange rate risk, do not seem to work. If inves-
tors faced higher (variable) costs of transacting in
foreign markets, we would expect them to trade
foreign securities less. Instead, the opposite
seems to be the case. Tesar and Werner found
that turnover rates on the foreign-held compo-
nent of national stock markets are much higher
than on the domestically held component. This
casts doubt on the role of transactions costs in
producing home bias. Introducing exchange rate
risk does not provide an explanation either, since
investors can hedge most ofthis risk in the bond
market. For example, consider a U.s. resident
who owns japanese stock. This investor faces the
risk that the yen will depreciate, thus reducing
the return when expressed in dollars. However,
to hedge this risk the U.S. investor can borrow
yen and lend dollars. Now ifthe yen depreciates,
the loss on his holdings ofjapanese stocks is off-
set by a gain from his yen loan (that is, he gets to
pay back the loan with "cheaper" yen). Thus, ex-
change rate uncertainty should be reflected in a
home bias in bond portfolios, not stock portfolios.
These considerations suggest that something
fundamental is missing from the CAPM. Of the
assumptions that Sharpe and Lintner make, one
in particular is likely responsible for its inaccu-
rate predictions; namely, the standard CAPM
assumes that everyone produces and consumes
the same goods. This is an especially dubious
assumption in an international context because
transportation costs and comparative advantage
considerations tend to lead countries toward spe-
cialization. Interestingly, recent work has shownthat relaxing this assumption can dramatically
reduce the predicted gains from international
diversification.
Specialization, the terms of trade,
and the gains from diversification
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) relax the assumption
that countries produce identical goods. Instead,
they assume that countries are specialized in the
production of their own unique good. To incor-
porate risk, Cole and Obstfeld assume output is
random, and therefore individuals residing in
different countries want to pool their risks by
exchanging equity claims.
Using this model, Cole and Obstfeld make an
intriguing discovery. Perhaps the reason why
countries are not more diversified internationally
is thatthe gains to such diversification are small.
How can this be? The crucial added feature in
a world in which countries produce different
goods is the possibility of changes in the "terms
of trade" (that is, the relative price of foreign
goods in terms of domestic goods). Cole and
Obstfeld show that market-clearing movements
in the terms of trade tend to provide "natural in-
surance" against domestic output fluctuations:
Whena nation's output declines unexpectedly,
the shortfall in supply tends to raise its price, that
is, the nation enjoys an offsetting improvement
in its terms of trade. For example, even without
equity trade, Brazil is partially insured against a
bad coffee harvest, since a bad harvest will lead
to higher coffee prices in the world market.
Naturally, the importance of this effect depends
on how much the terms of trade adjust in re-
sponse to relative output fluctuations. To quantify
this effect Cole and Obstfeld simulate their model
and find that offsetting movements in the terms
of trade significantly reduce the gains from diver-
sification. For example. when the terms oftrade
offset halfthe reduction in output, so that a 10 per-
cent decline in relative output results in a 5 per-
cent improvement in the terms of trade, Cole and
Obstfeld's results imply that the gains from diver-
sification decline by about 75 percent. Com-
pared to the earlier results, this would imply an
annual benefit of "only" $119 billion.
Conclusion
What have we learned? First, by the usual stan-
dards of cost-benefit analysis, the gains from
international diversification are quite large. Sec-
ond, the work of Cole and Obstfeld suggests that
a nation's benefit from diversification likely de-
pends on its economic size. Small countries,
whose terms oftrade are dictated by the world
market, are likely to benefit relatively more than
large countries. This is because large countries
like the U.S. and Japan tend to receive natural
insurance against output fluctuations via offset-
ting terms of trade changes. Thus, an important
topic for future research is to estimate econo-
metrically the actual magnitude of the terms of
trade effect in order to obtain a more precise
measure of the gains from diversification for large
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